

# Market structure and taxation in urban mobility with fleets

by Federico Boffa | Alberto Iozzi | Muhammad Ceesay | Libera Università di Bolzano | Università di Roma Tor Vergata | Università di Roma Tor Vergata

Abstract ID: 238

Inviato: 12/04/2023

Evento: XXI Workshop Annuale SIEPI

Argomento: 2. Concorrenza, antitrust

Parole chiave: Fleets; Market Structure; Public Transport; Regulation

We build a model with travelers that are heterogeneous in their value of time, choose among public transport, private vehicles or fleet vehicle, and exhibit a congestion disutility if they travel by car, and a cost of lack of flexibility if they travel by public transport.

Our model, consistently with empirical evidence, predicts that, under reasonable assumptions, individuals with low value of time and low disutility from congestion tend to use public transport and that, on the contrary, the use of ride-sharing vehicles is widespread among individuals with high value of time and high disutility from congestion.

We characterize the allocation emerging in equilibrium when the fleet is operated by a monopoly, or in a perfectly competitive industry. We show that this pattern is replicated even in the welfare maximizing allocation, which, however, exhibits differences vis-à-vis both the competitive and the monopolistic allocations.

We then characterize the welfare impact of some potential policy measures and their propensity to restore first best.